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SECURITIES REGULATION-APPLICABILITY OF EXCHANGE ACT SECTION 10(b) TO TRANSACTION EFFECTED BY MEANS OF INTRASTATE TELEPHONE

CALL-Plaintiff alleged that he had been defrauded in a sale of securities
to the defendant. Plaintiff attempted to invoke section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1984, which prohibits various fraudulent practices in
securities trading.' In order to state a cause of action under 10(b), it was
necessary for plaintiff to allege that a means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce had been used directly or indirectly in connection with the
sale. The sale in this case had been effected through telephone conversations over wires located within the city of Philadelphia. However, the wires
carrying the calls could be used for interstate as well as intrastate calls. On
defendant's motion for summary judgment, held, motion granted. The
character of the telephone as an instrumentality of commerce should be
determined by the use to which it is put, and Congress did not intend to
include the use of a telephone for an intrastate call within the phrase "use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce." Rosen v. Albern
Color Research, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 473 (E.D. Pa. 1963). In a case decided
within one week of the Rosen case, the opposite result was reached on similar
facts, the court's theory being that a telephone is by nature an instrumentality of interstate commerce; thus any use of the telephone satisfies the requirements of section 10(b).2 Nemitz v. Cunny, 221 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. Ill. 1963).
The issue of whether the use of a telephone for an intrastate call comes
within the wording of a federal statute has arisen in only one other situation.
Under section 605 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934 (which prohibits the interception and publishing of the contents of any telephone
communication),3 evidence acquired by wire-tapping intrastate phone conversations is excluded from a federal prosecution.4 The wiretap situation,
however, is distinguishable from the principal cases. Since section 605
refers to "any communication," the language is easily read to cover intrastate communication. Furthermore, since the purpose of the Communications Act is specifically to regulate the actual use of interstate communication, section 605 should extend to intrastate phone calls in the interest of
protecting interstate commerce; once a tap is on a wire, both interstate
and intrastate calls are intercepted indiscriminately. No such problem of
I "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange . .. (b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not
so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate
in the public interest or for the protection of investors." 48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b) (1958) [hereinafter cited as Exchange Act].
The court also held that the statute, so interpreted, is constitutional.
3 48 Stat. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1958).
4 Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321, 331 (1939). It has also been established that
criminal liability can arise from such an interception. Lipinski v. United States, 251
F.2d 53 (10th Cir. 1958).
2
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discriminating between interstate and intrastate calls arises in relation to
section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.
The Exchange Act was aimed at the control of securities trading and
speculation in all forms, with the emphasis on compelling full disclosure
of corporate and exchange affairs through various registration and reporting requirements. 5 Section 10(b) seems to have been intended as a catchall provision. 6 The courts have therefore adopted a policy of interpreting
the text of 10(b) "as far as the meaning of the words fairly permits" in

order to fulfill the "dominating general purpose" of the act. 7
In line with this policy of judicial expansion, the courts have inferred
a civil action in section 10(b), despite the absence of express authorization
in the statute.8 Section 10(b) has not been limited by the boundaries of
common-law fraud, but a higher duty of disclosure has been demanded.9
Recently, the requirement of privity between the parties has been relaxed, 0
and a cause of action in favor of a corporation has been inferred." The
courts have required only a slight connection between the fraud and the
telephone call, with no requirement that the misrepresentation be made in
the telephone conversation itself. 12 Finally, isolated, face-to-face transactions
outside the organized securities market have been held covered, provided

the interstate commerce requirements were met.'3 The judicial history
chronicled above dearly demonstrates a policy in favor of extensive regulation of securities frauds.14 Perhaps this policy will be controlling if the
intent of Congress in using the phrase "instrumentality of interstate commerce" cannot be established. It would seem that Congress would have
used language expressly covering all transactions which it could constitutionally regulate unless the words "instrumentality of interstate commerce"
5 See Exchange Act § 2, 48 Stat. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1958); H.R. REP. No. 1383,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
6 See Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627, 631 (9th Cir. 1953).
7 Matheson v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670, 674 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 870
(1961).
8 E.g., Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627, 631-33 (9th Cir. 1953).
9 Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1963); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp.
808 (D. Del. 1951).
10 Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
11 Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
12 Matheson v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 870 (1961).
13 Matheson v. Armbrust, supra note 12. In this case a telephone call was made from
Portland, Oregon, to Pasco, Washington, requesting that the plaintiff return to Portland
to resume negotiations. The plaintiff did return, misrepresentations by the defendant
were made at face-to-face meetings, and a sale of the entire capital stock of a corporation
resulted.
14 In general, the judicial extensions cited above have been looked upon with approval.
See, e.g., Cary, Israels & Loss, Recent Developments in Securities Regulation, 63 COLUm.
L. Rxv. 856 (1963). Similarly liberal construction may be found in other securities fraud
legislation. E.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963) (Investment Advisers Act of 1940); United States v. Ross, 321 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1963) (Securities
Act of 1933). But see Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5: Judicial Revision of
Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. Rav. 627 (1963), arguing that the extension of 10(b) has
been violative of congressional intent.
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were intended to place some limitation on federal power over securities
fraud,15 but an examination of the legislative history of the Exchange Act
gives no hint as to what Congress might have meant. Therefore, Congress
must have been confident that the words "use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce" had an established meaning.
The Nemitz court cited a number of cases in which the telegraph or
telephone was held an instrument of interstate commerce. 16 In all these
decisions, however, the labeling of the telephone as an instrument of interstate commerce was based on or could have been based on a particular
interstate transmission.' 7 Moreover, these cases specifically stated that it is
a message passing over state lines which constitutes the interstate commerce,' 8 thus indicating that, in attaching the label "instrumentality of
interstate commerce," these courts were thinking only in terms of interstate
communication. The Federal Communications Act, enacted the same year
as the Exchange Act, distinguishes between interstate and intrastate communication, expressly prohibiting any construction that would extend the
provisions of the act to intrastate commerce. 19 Analogously, resolution of
the question whether to treat a railroad locomotive as an instrumentality
20
of interstate commerce has depended upon its use in commerce.
Examination of analogous statutes further supports the conclusion that
the use of a telephone for an intrastate call is not the use of an instrumentality of interstate commerce. Section 17(a), the general anti-fraud provision
of the Securities Act of 1933,21 is very similar to section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act. In fact, when section 10(b) was implemented by Rule lOb-5, 22
the Securities and Exchange Commission used language virtually identical
to that of 17(a) in listing the specific acts henceforth to be prohibited under
10(b), and stated that Rule lOb-5 was promulgated, inter alia, to dose a
loophole in 17(a) by making applicable to the purchaser of securities the
same anti-fraud provisions which Congress had imposed on the seller of
15 The use of this language also indicates that Congress did not intend that the
reach of 10(b) be as broad as the scope of Congress' constitutional power to regulate
interstate commerce. If X, standing on one side of a state line, sells a security to Y,
standing on the other side of the line, this would be a transaction in interstate
commerce within Congress' constitutional power; however, it would not be a transaction
effected by the use of the mails, a national securities exchange, or an instrumentality
of interstate commerce so as to make 10(b) applicable.
16 E.g., Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627, 631 (9th Cir. 1953) (action under 10(b) in
which a telephone call was made across state lines); Western Union Tel. Co. v. James,
162 U.S. 650 (1896) (the leading case holding that the telegraph is an instrument of
interstate commerce subject to federal authority).
17 Ibid.
18 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490, 502 (1944); Western Union
Tel. Co. v. James, supra note 16.
19 Federal Communications Act § 2, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 152 (1958).
20 Minneapolis & St. L.R.R. v. Winters, 242 U.S. 353, 357 (1917); Conklin v. New York
Cent. R.R., 238 N.Y. 570, 144 N.E. 895 (1924); Ruck v. Chicago M. & S.P.R.R., 153
Wis. 158, 140 N.W. 1074 (1913).
21 Securities Act of 1933, § 17(a), 48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1958).
22 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1949) (formerly denominated Rule X-101-5).
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securities through section 17(a). 28 The courts, too, have held that sections
17(a) and 10(b) should be construed in pan materia.24 The only other
difference between the two sections is that 17(a) prohibits fraud by the use
of "instruments of ... communication in interstate commerce," rather than
by the use of an "instrumentality of interstate commerce," and thus requires
an interstate communication before a cause of action may be stated. (Emphasis added.) Aside from a possible desire for conciseness, there is no
explanation of why this substitution was made. It would seem, however,
that, just as the SEC and the courts have looked upon 17(a) and 10(b) as
part of the same statutory scheme, Congress intended that the two sections
cover the same degree of commerce.
The history of the "wire fraud" act demonstrates a similar interchangeable use of "in" and "of" by Congress. As part of the 1952 amendments to
the Federal Communications Act, Congress added to the federal Criminal
Code the wire fraud provision, which prohibits fraud in general by "means
of interstate wire,"'2 5 thus presenting the same ambiguity as section 10(b)
of the Exchange Act. Inadvertently, Congress had omitted the regulation of
foreign communication from the 1952 act, and the statute was amended in
1956. However, in redrafting the statute, Congress without any explanation
changed the language applicable to domestic communication to read: "by
means of wire . . . in interstate commerce." 26 Furthermore, the House
committee, in considering the 1956 amendment, seemed to assume that the
1952 act had applied solely to interstate communications. 27
When one considers the many transactions which take place daily
within a city such as Philadelphia or New York with which a telephone
conversation is somehow connected, the significance of extending the
language of section 10(b) to include transactions effected by means of an
intrastate telephone call is apparent. If 10(b) is so extended, nothing but
strictly face-to-face transactions would remain exempt. Aside from policy
considerations, the cases and statutes which involve the term "instrumentality of interstate commerce" indicate that the Rosen court correctly held
that Congress did not intend to include the use of a telephone for an
intrastate call within the phrase "use of an instrumentality of interstate
commerce." The Nemitz court, however, in holding that a cause of action
does arise under section 10(b), recognized the prevailing policy in favor of
extensive securities regulation. Seemingly, there will be considerable disagreement as to the conclusiveness of the Rosen court's showing of congres23

SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3230, May 21, 1942.

24

Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 103 F. Supp. 954, 964

(N.D.

Ill. 1952).
18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1958).
Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
27 "[T]his bill amends . . . [§ 1343] which imposes penalties for schemes to defraud
in interstate commerce through the use of wire, radio and television communication."
H.R. REP. No. 2385, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1956).
25

26
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sional intent. Therefore, congressional clarification should be given before
the confusion engendered by the section's ambiguous language spreads much
further.
Michael A. Warner

